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Judges, Friends, and Facebook: The Ethics of
Prohibition
SAMUEL VINCENT JONES*
The concept offriendship has enjoyed a renewed prominence in the vocabulary
of the new digital social networks that have emerged in the last few years. The
concept is one of the noblest achievements of human culture. It is in and through
our friendships that we grow and develop as humans. For this reason, true
friendship has always been seen as one of the greatestgoods any human person
can experience. We should be careful, therefore, never to trivialize the concept or
the experience offriendship. It would be sad if our desire to sustain and develop
on-line friendships were to be at the cost of our availabilityto engage with our
families, our neighbours and those we meet in the daily reality of our places of
work, education and recreation.If the desirefor virtual connectedness becomes
obsessive, it may in fact function to isolate individuals from real social
interaction while also disrupting the patterns of rest, silence and reflection that
are necessaryfor healthy human development. -Pope Benedict XVI 1
INTRODUCTION

Since 2004, electronic social networking ("ESN") websites such as Facebook
and MySpace have become a significant component of American culture,
reportedly acquiring more than 500 million members. 2 Any person with an e-mail
account can join and use an ESN site. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
estimates that there are approximately 200 different ESN sites.3 Among attorneys

* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. The author is a former U.S.
Army judge advocate (Major, USAR (Ret.)) and former Special Advisor to the Chair,Illinois Judicial Council.
The author sincerely thanks Erin McKibben, Esq. and Carson Griffis for their research assistance and extends a
special thanks to his family for their unwavering kindheartedness and support. @ 2011, Samuel Vincent Jones.
1. Benedict XVI, Pope, Message of the Holy Father Benedict XVI for the 43" World Communications Day:
New Technologies, New Relationships. Promoting a Culture of Respect, Dialogue and Friendship (May 24,
2009), available at http://www.vatican.va/holyjather/benedict_xvilmessages/communications/documents/
hf ben-xvi-mes_.20090124_43rd-world-communications-dayen.html.
2. Quentin Hardy, In Zuckerberg We Trust, FoRBEs MAG., Oct. 11, 2010, at 80, available at http://
www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/1011 /rich-list-10-technology-facebook-google-laws-zuckerberg-we-trust.html
(stating that Facebook is a network of 500 million customers); see also Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of
One's Own: On Privacyand Online Social Networks, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PRoP. 73, 74 (2007), availableat
http://www.law.northwestem.eduljournals/njtip/v6/nl/4/Abril.pdf ("If MySpace alone were a country and each
of its profiles a person, it would be the 12th most populous nation in the world.").
3. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Social Networking Sites: Online Friendships Can Mean
Offline Peril (Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2006/april.
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surveyed by the American Bar Association ("ABA"), forty-three percent used at
least one ESN site in 2009, an increase of approximately 300% from 2008.4
Because ESN websites enable members to use a computer or personal digital
assistant ("PDA") to instantly disseminate information to millions of people, ESN
websites have become increasingly popular. ESN easily allows users to: cultivate social
connections, 5 enhance political campaign marketing,6 locate people,7 facilitate romantic interaction/dating," share personal information,9 and supplement litigation methodologies.o The consequences of ESN usage, however, are not all favorable, as
widespread concern has arisen regarding jury misconduct," privacy invasion,12

4. Reginald F. Davis, Getting Personal:Social Networks Appeal, But Not to the Firm, 95 A.B.A. J. 30, 30
(2009), available at http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/getting-personal/ (reporting fifteen percent
use in 2008 and forty-three percent use in 2009); see also John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs.
Rules of the Bar, N.Y TIMEs, Sept. 13, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/
13lawyers.html (reporting that a recent LexisNexis survey indicated "86 percent of lawyers ages 25 to 35 are
members of social networks like Facebook, LinkedIn and MySpace, as opposed to 66 percent of those over
46").
5. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IowA L. REv. 1137, 1154 (2009) ("[A] social network site
lets you make new friends and deepen your connection to your current ones."). A recent study that "sampled the
habits of 1,605 adults using social media between May and June" of 2010 revealed that women between the
ages of 18 to 34 primarily use Facebook. Over "half of young women (57%)" admit that "they talk to people
online more than face-to-face" and "39% of them proclaim themselves Facebook addicts, while 34% of [them]
make Facebook the first thing they do when they wake up, even before brushing their teeth or going to the
bathroom and 21% of women age 18-34 check Facebook in the middle of the night." See Ben Parr, The First
Thing Women Do in the Morning: Check Facebook [Study],MASHABLE (July 7,2010), http://mashable.com/2010/
07/07/oxygen-facebook-study Commentators note that use of social media such as Facebook differs among
genders, with women making up approximately 57% of the social media population and using it primarily for
connecting with people, while men use it primarily as a means to obtain information and improve social status.
See Jenna Goudreau, What Men and Women Are Doing on Facebook, FORBEs.coM (Apr. 26, 2010, 6:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/26/popular-social-networking-sites-forbes-woman-time-facebook-twitter.
html.
6. See Miriam Rozen, Social Networks Help Judges Do Their Duties, TEx. LAW., Aug. 24, 2009, at 1,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id= 1202433293771.
7. Id.
8. Grimmelmann, supra note 5, at 1154. A 2010 study revealed that "50%of women believe that it's just fine
to date people they've met on Facebook, compared to 65% of men." See Parr,supra note 5.
9. Grimmelman, supra note 5, at 1152-53. Studies indicate that 42% of women between the ages of 18-34
consider it appropriate to "post photos of themselves intoxicated, while 79% consider it appropriate to display
themselves "kissing in photos" and 49% of women between ages 18-34 believe it's appropriate to "keep tabs on
a boyfriend by having access to his accounts," with "42% of men" feeling the "same way." See Parr,supra note
5.
10. Rozen, supra note 6, at 4.
11. Martha Neil, Oops. JurorCalls Defendant Guilty on Facebook,Before Verdict, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 2, 2010,
1:28 PM), http://www.abajoumal.comInews/article/oops.-juror-calls-defendantguilty on_facebook-though.
verdict isnt_in; see also Candice Williams, Facebook Juror Fined, Apologizes for Posting, DETROIT NEWS,
Sept. 3, 2010, at Al2 (stating that juror was fined $250 for announcing a guilty verdict on Facebook before the
conclusion of a trial).
12. Grimmelmann, supra note 5, at 1140; see also Abril, supra note 2, at 74 (describing the danger social
networking sites present to privacy because "privacy harms are no longer short-lived and innocuous ... [I]nformation's digital permanence, searchability, replicability, transformability, and multitude of often
unintended audiences make its effects more damaging than ever."); Alejandro Martinez-Cabrera, Now
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deception,13 and misrepresentation.14 The perils associated with ESN website usage are
not limited to the actual ESN users but often. permeate throughout their families,
communities, and social networks. For example, ESN activity has been cited as a
catalyst behind at least twenty percent of the divorces filed in the United States's and is
also linked to a wide range of sexual and physical violence against children.16
Facebook, arguably the most popular ESN website, permits users to identify,
contact, and befriend other members. 17 The solicited member must approve the

Facebook Wants LocatorApp Like TWitter, S.F. CHRON., July 17, 2010, at D2 (reporting that Facebook seeks to
include an application that lets other users know where a person is sending updates from and that a poll revealed
that "half of all social networking users in the United States are either 'concerned' or 'very concerned' about
their privacy"); Twitter Settles FTC Privacy Charge, INVESTORs.CoM, (June 24, 2010, 6:40 PM), http://
www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article/538399/201006242340Trwitter-settles-FTC-privacy-charge.,
aspx; James Temple, Local Class Action Complaint Filed Over Google Buzz, TECH CHRONICLEs (Feb. 17, 2010,
4:14 PM), http://blog.seattlepi.com/techchron/archives/194949.asp (reporting that a class action suit against
Google Buzz alleged violations of "various electronic communications laws, including the Consumer Fraud and
Abuse Act" for sharing user information without consent).
13. Tiffany M. Williams, Social Networking Sites Carry Ethics Trapsand Reminders, LrrG. NEWS (Aug. 27,
2009), http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/top-stories/social-networking-ethics.htnl. In one instance, a deposition inquirer thought that one of a witness's ESN webpages contained information that would
later be useful in impeaching the opposing witness. See Phila. Bar Prof'1 Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02, at 1, 3
(2009), available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/Web
ServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf. Frustrated that he could not view the information in the
witness' profile himself, the inquirer proposed that a third person request the witness' friendship so that the third
person could then view the witness' profile, and pass along the information to the inquirer. See id. The
Committee found that such conduct would violate the ethical rules, because the planned communication
between the third party and the witness was deceptive. Id.
14. Nathan M. Crystal, Ethical Issues in Using Social Networking Sites, S.C. LAw., Nov. 2009, at 8; Ken
Strutin, Pretexting, Legal Ethics and Social Networking Sites, LLRX.coM (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.llrx.com/
node/2205/print.
15. Is Facebook a New Tool for Cheating? (CNN television broadcast July 15, 2010), available at
http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/bestoftv/2010/07/15/pn.facebook.affairs.discussion.cnn?iref= allsearch (stating that social media such as Facebook has been linked to "one in five divorce cases"); Linda Lewis Griffith,
Let's Face It: Facebook is Becoming a Factorin Divorce, TRmuNE (San Luis Obispo, Cal.), July 2, 2010,
available at http://www.sanluisobispo.com/2010/07/01/1201608/lets-face-it-facebook-is-becoming.html#
storylink=nirelated ("Recent research found that 20 percent of divorcing couples now mention Facebook as
the cause of their breakups."); see also Juju Chang, Facebook Infidelity: Cheating Spouses Go Online, ABC
NEWs, Nov. 30, 2010, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/facebook-infidelity-cheating-spousesonline/story?id= 12272421; Greg Groogan, Facebook a Factorin Infidelity, MY Fox HousToN (Dec. 6, 2010,
7:11 PM), http://www.myfoxhouston.com/dpp/news/local/I01206-facebook-a-factor-in-infidelity; Carolyn Davis, Divorce, Facebook Style, PHmLA. INQUIRER, July 12, 2010, http://articles.philly.com/2010-07-12/news/
24967905_1_facebook-popular-social-networking-website-divorce-case (discussing man who discovered wife
using Facebook to engage in an extra-marital affair).
16. Susan Hanley Duncan, MySpace is Also Their Space: Ideas for Keeping Children Safe From Sexual
Predatorson Social Networking Sites, 96 KY. L.J. 527, 527-28 (2007-2008).
17. Facebook's PrivacyPolicy, FAcEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php?ref-pf (last visited Jan. 11,
2011). But see Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009), available at http://www.jud6.org/
LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2009/2009-20.html (holding that a judge may not
request or accept the "friendship" of any lawyer who may appear before him on an ESN site). ESNs can be
useful professionally as well. See Kelly Phillips Erb, Put Your Best Face Forward-Online,PA. LAw., Dec.
2009, at 32 ("Law firms now use social networking sites to build brands, manage their online reputations,
engage clients and attract new talent.").
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"friend" request in order for the relationship to be so identified.' 8 By virtue of this
"friendship," members acquire the capacity to exchange electronic communications and observe one another's postings, statements, profile behavior, photos,
and/or friends, fans, or contacts.' 9 Facebook also provides its members with a
"wall," on which other members are allowed to post messages, 2 0 a messaging
system that permits members to email one another 2 ' a "poking" function by
which members can draw the attention of other members,2 2 and the means to post
photos and "tag" other users in those photos.2 3
Legal constructions have long struggled to keep pace with such technology. 24
ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm questions whether the ethics rules have kept
pace with ESN activity.25 Some commentators even maintain that ESN technology has "outpaced" legal ethics rules. 2 6 Within the growing examination of the
ESN phenomenon, research has focused on ESN capacities to facilitate robust
pedagogical, entertainment, social, and commercial opportunities for attorneys.
Use of ESN websites by judges or judicial candidates, whose conduct is governed

18. Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help (follow "Friends" hyperlink; then follow
"Adding friends," and "Friend requests" hyperlinks) (last visited Jan. 11, 2011); see also Fla. Judicial Ethics
Advisory Comm., supra note 17 ("The member of the social network must approve a person who requests to be
identified as the member's 'friend."').
19. Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., supra note 17; see also Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti,
PreservingIdentities: Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and
Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 114 (2009) ("The key element of a social networking site (such as
Facebook) is that individuals can share information with their friends (who are also members of the site).").
20. Help Center, supra note 18 (follow "Wall" hyperlink; then follow "How to use the Wall feature"
hyperlink); see also Grimmelmann, supra note 5, at 1145 ("Each user's profile page has a 'Wall' where other
users can post messages.").
21. Help Center, supra note 18 (follow "Messages" hyperlink; then follow "Sending a message" hyperlink);
see also Grimmelmann, supra note 5, at 1145 ("There's also a private, email-like 'Message' system . . . .").
22. Help Center, supra note 18 (follow "Home and News Feed" hyperlink; then follow "Pokes" hyperlink);
see also Grimmelmann, supra note 5, at 1145 ("[T]he 'Poke' system, whose only message is 'You were poked
by

.').

23. Help Center, supra note 18 (follow "Photos" hyperlink; then follow "Viewing and editing," "Tagging,"
and "Privacy and abuse" hyperlinks); see also Grimmelmann, supra note 5, at 1145-46 ("There's a
photo-sharing feature, imaginatively named 'Photos,' with a clever tagging system: click on a face in a
photo-even one posted by someone else-and you can enter the person's name.").
24. RAYMOND WACds, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE PRIVATE DOMAIN 274 (Hong Kong Univ. Press 2000); see
also Ralph C. Losey, Lawyers Behaving Badly: Understanding Unprofessional Conduct in E-Discovery, 60
MERCER L. Rav. 983, 986 (2009) (attributing the failure of law to keep up with technology to both lawyers'
"archetypal personalit[ies]" and "the failure of most law schools to adapt to the modem technological
revolution"); Dahlia Lithwick & Graham Vyse, Tweet Justice: Should Judges Be Using Social Media?, SLATE
(Apr. 30, 2010, 6:22 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2252544/ ("It will take years for the courts to sort out
questions about new technology and privacy. And by the time they do, Tweeting and Facebook will be pass6.").
25. Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics Commission to Address
Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing U.S. Lawyers (Aug. 4,2009), http://www.abanet.org/abanet/
media/release/newsrelease.cfm?releaseid=730 (detailing the creation of the ABA Commission. on Ethics
20/20 formed from judges and attorneys from all areas and sizes of practice).
26. See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, Ethics of Lawyer Social Networking, 73 ALB. L. REV. 113, 114 (2009). This
article, however, did not address the ethical issues as they pertained to judges. See id. at 114 n.9.
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by well-established ethical standards, has received scant attention despite the
enormous potential for ESN activity to negatively affect a judge's reputation and
duties to the public. The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct ("Judicial Code"), 27 like
most legal ethics paradigms, does not explicitly address ESN usage.28 Despite the
precarious ethical implications regarding ESN "friendships," there is a lack of
clarity and agreement among the various state judicial ethics commissions
regarding the permissibility of ESN "friending" under the Judicial Code.
This essay represents a first step in exploring the ethical risks judges encounter
when using ESN websites. It examines the practical and jurisprudential
arguments for and against ESN "friending" and weighs ESN behavioral
capacities against the constraints enumerated under the Judicial Code. It posits
that an interpretation of the Judicial Code that restricts judges from ESN
"friending" is warranted given the enormous potential for ESN "friending" to
compromise the prestige of the judicial office and threaten public confidence in
the judiciary. In so doing, this essay demonstrates that the current Judicial Code,
albeit silent regarding ESN usage, contains adequate prohibitions to control the
effects of ESN on the judiciary.
I. THE JUDICIAL CODE AND THE PUBLIC
The purpose of the Judicial Code is fueled by the imperative to maintain public
confidence in the judiciary.2 9 Justice Frankfurter once noted, "The Court's
authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on
sustained public confidence in its moral sanction."3 o Similarly, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota recognized that judges "symbolize the law and justice
and, consequently, their action and behavior will reflect favorably or unfavorably
on the integrity of the judiciary and the high respect required in the administration of justice."3 It continued,
It is not merely sufficient to do justice but the public and society must have
good cause and reason to believe that justice, in fact, is being done. . . . We are
also convinced that the ... Code of Judicial Conduct [was] designed and
adopted to accomplish this, as well as to require that the judge not only act

27. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucr (2004), reprintedin PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS,
RULES & STATUTEs 512-604 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 2009-2010 ed.) [hereinafter MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT].

28. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3 ("Because it is not practical to list all ...
conduct, the Rule is necessarily cast in general terms."); Bennett, supra note 26, at 114.

29. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcr pmbl.; see Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 949, 951 (1996) ("The objective of the Code is to maintain both the reality of

judicial integrity and the appearance of that reality. The public has confidence in judges who show character,
impartiality, and diligence.").
30. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
31. In re Cieminski, 270 N.W.2d 321, 327 (N.D. 1978).
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impartially but also that the litigants and society believe that the judge did, in

fact, act impartially. 32

Put succinctly, one fundamental purpose of the Judicial Code is to guide the
conduct of judges in order to increase public confidence in the judiciary. Hence,
the Judicial Code exists for the benefit of the public.
An independent bench is critical to maintaining public confidence in the
judiciary and is central to American jurisprudence.33 Because the judiciary
possesses enormous power to provide justice to citizens, and is removed from the
influence of the executive or legislative branches, any sort of judicial misconduct
has the potential to threaten the prestige and the authority of the judiciary. 34 The
Judicial Code attempts to uphold the prestige of the judiciary3 5 by shaping
conduct that is consistent with the independence of the judiciary.3 6 The
constraints the Judicial Code places on a judge's behavior and expressions are
designed to buttress the importance of judicial independence. 3 7 Hence, interference with ajudge's freedom regarding ESN usage is not only for the benefit of the
public, but is also for the benefit of the judge.38
II. ESN USAGE AND JUDICIAL CODE VIOLATIONS: Two APPROACHES

To date, research has not revealed a court decision or ethics opinion that found
that a judge violated the Judicial Code by simply joining an ESN site, such as
Facebook or Twitter.39 Naturally, the manner in which a judge engages in ESN,
32. Id. (quoting an anonymous former judge).
33. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. ("An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable
to our system of justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an independent,
impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of integrity, will interpret and apply the law
that governs our society. Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and the
rule of law.").
34. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl.; Raymond J. McKoski, Ethical Considerationsin the Use
of Judicial Stationery for Private Purposes, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 471, 475 (2007) (citing United States v.
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (1990)).
35. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcr pmbl., Canon 1; see also McKoski, supra note 34, at 475
("Because of the serious threat to the integrity and independence of the judiciary caused by the misuse of the
judicial office, a central purpose of all canons of judicial ethics is to eliminate abuse of a judge's power and
prestige.").
36. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2; Judge Irving R. Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The
Function ofa Code ofJudicial Ethics,35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROIs. 3, 3 (1970).
37. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 & cmt. 3 ("Conduct that ... appears to compromise the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the judiciary.").
38. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R 1.2 & cmt. 2 ("A judge should expect to be the subject of
public scrutiny that might be viewed as burdensome if applied to other citizens, and must accept the restrictions
imposed by the Code."). But see Raymond J. McKoski, JudicialDiscipline and the Appearance ofImpropriety:
What the Public Sees is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 1950-84 (2010) (arguing that the First
Amendment costs of the "appearance of impropriety" standard outweigh any purported benefits).
39. See Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., supra note 17 (approving of a judge or his or her campaign
committee posting on an ESN site comments that do not violate the Code and of a judge's campaign committee

HeinOnline -- 24 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 286 2011

2011]

JUDGES, FRIENDS, AND FACEBOOK

287

however, may conflict with the standards enunciated under the Judicial Code.4
Among the most potentially problematic ESN activities involves judges engaging
in Facebook "friending." Because friendships can be "every bit as intimate as
love, marriage, or business," they present unique legal ethics challenges because
judges, as human beings, may be predisposed to favor their friends, which may
include social networking friends.4 1 Friendships between judges and possible
litigants or attorneys of records that "exceed[] ordinary and reasonable social
intercourse between acquaintances and business associates" often necessitate
judicial recusal or disqualification. 42 Tis would include ESN "friending." Ethics
opinions regarding a judge's ESN "friending" center on two dominant but
competing approaches, which I term integrative and restrictive.Proponents of the
integrative approach to ESN "friendships" are inclined to characterize ESN
"friending" as a permissible activity that promotes public confidence in the

using an ESN site to list supporters of his or her candidacy); N.Y. State Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op.
08-176 (2009), availableat http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/08-176.htm (stating that there is
nothing "inherently inappropriate" with a judge using a social networking site); S.C. Advisory Comm. on
Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009), availableat http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/advisoryOpinions/
displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo= 17-2009 ("A judge may be a member of Facebook and be friends with law
enforcement officers and employees of the Magistrate as long as they do not discuss anything related to the
judge's position as magistrate.").
40. See N.Y. State Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, supra note 39.
The Committee cannot discern anything inherently inappropriate about a judge joining and making
use of a social network. A judge generally may socialize in person with attorneys who appear in the
judge's court, subject to the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct . .. Thus, the question is not whether a
judge can use a social network but rather, how he/she does so.
Id. (emphasis added). With regard to ESNs and attorneys:
The rules of legal ethics still apply. Keep in mind that the duties of confidentiality, limits on lawyer
advertising and restrictions relating to communications are just as important online as offline. Be
professional as you build your network: Popularity should never be confused with integrity.
Erb, supra note 17, at 35.
41. Jeremy M. Miller, JudicialRecusal and Disqualification:The Needfor a PerSe Rule on Friendship(Not
Acquaintance), 33 PEPP L. REv. 575, 586, 608-09 (2006).
42. Id. at 578-79 ("Friendship is loyalty, and loyalty to one side of a case (be it a named party or lawyer) is
the perfect antonym to impartiality."). In light of the significant potential for friendships to engender partiality,
some commentators have even argued for the establishment of a "friendship recusal rule." See, e.g., id. at
608-09. One commentator argues that judges should consider recusal when their social relations create or
appear to create partiality upon consideration of many factors:
(1) the duration of the relationship or [social] contact; (2) the content of any conversation during the
relationship or [social] contact; (3) the nature and circumstances of the relationship or [social]
contact; (4) the frequency of meetings or conversations; (5) the personal dependence of either [party]
on the relationship; (6) whether the relationship was connected with the subject matter of the
proceeding; (7) in a business relationship, whether the judge receives preferential treatment not
granted to others; (8) whether the relationship has been the subject of media publicity; and (9)
statements attributable to the judge or any other person about the relationship.
Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be
Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 55, 98 (2000).
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judiciary, while adherents of the restrictive approach are disposed to view ESN
"friending," quite justifiably, as an impermissible activity that compromises
public confidence in the judiciary.
A. THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH
When considering whether ESN "friending" violates judicial ethics standards,
a New York Ethics Commission reasoned that a violation occurs whenever a
judge's conduct could negatively influence or destroy the public's confidence in
the judge's decision-making or the prestige of the judicial office.43 When
addressing specific usage, the Commission did not specifically permit or restrict
any particular ESN "friending" conduct." Instead, it left the determination to the
discretion of individual judges.4 5 Similarly, when considering whether a judge
runs afoul of ethics rules by ESN "friending," the South Carolina Advisory
Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct ("South Carolina Commission")
reasoned that a judge's ESN "friending" not only does not violate legal ethics
requirements to act in a manner that promotes public confidence, it implied that
ESN "friending," in fact, enhances the public's confidence in the judiciary.4 6 The
South Carolina Commission opined that a judge's ESN "friending" may promote
public confidence in the judiciary by preventing the judge from isolating him or
herself from the community, 47 which is consistent with the duty to participate in
community activities that promote "public understanding of and confidence in
the administration of justice."4 8 According to the South Carolina Commission,
the transparency and judicial integration that a judge's ESN "friending" allows
the public to observe how the judge communicates and behaves, thus providing
the public with greater understanding and confidence in its judiciary. 49 The South
Carolina Commission concluded that a judge may even choose to "befriend" law
enforcement officers and employees on ESN websites, provided the judge does
not discuss matters related to the judge's official duties.so

43. See N.Y. State Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, supra note 39 (stating that judges share a duty to
consider how the public will view content on the judge's ESN page and how they will adjust their behavior
accordingly).
44. Id.
45. Id. ("The Committee urges all judges using social networks to, as a baseline, employ an appropriate level
of prudence, discretion and decorum in how they make use of this technology. . .
46. S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, supra note 39.
47. Id.
48. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 6; see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt.
2 ("Participation in both law-related and other extrajudicial activities helps integrate judges into their
communities, and furthers public understanding of and respect for courts and the judicial system.").
49. S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, supra note 39.
50. Id. The integrative approach adopted by the South Carolina Commission was also accepted by the
judicial ethics commissions in Ohio and Kentucky. See Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances
and Discipline, Op. 2010-7 (2010) (concluding that a "Ajudge may be a 'friend' on a social networking site with
a lawyer who appears as counsel in a case before the judge"); Ky. Jud. Ethics Comm'n, Op. JE-110 (2010) (The
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B. THE RESTRICTIVE APPROACH
Like the South Carolina Commission, the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory
Commission ("Florida Commission") acknowledged that "judges cannot isolate
themselves entirely" from the community nor be expected to avoid friendships
outside their judicial responsibilities. It also noted, however, that behavioral
restrictions are inherent in the judicial office and, thus, require some degree of
isolation from the public.5 2 The Florida Commission reasoned that certain forms
of conduct may harm the public's confidence in the judiciary.
In ascertaining the proper balance between avoiding isolation from the
community and maintaining judicial independence and public confidence, the
Florida Commission differed markedly from its South Carolina counterpart
regarding ESN "friending." It held that a judge's ESN "friending" violates the
Judicial Code when a judge's ESN webpage affords the judge the option to accept
or reject "friends," to denominate himself or herself as a "friend" on another ESN
user's. webpage, and to convey the existence of the "friendship" to the public.54
The Florida Commission found these features ethically unsound because a judge,
by selecting and publicizing ESN "friendships," conveys, or allows others to
convey, the impression that the "friend" is "in a special position to influence the
judge." 5 The dispositive question for the Florida Commission was not whether
an ESN "friend" is actually in a position to influence the judge, but whether the
identification of the person as a "friend" conveys the impression that the person is
in such a position.
Logic follows that if an ESN website provides judges the discretion to accept
or deny specific attorneys as "friends," this activity indicates the possibility of

commission stated that it is permissible for judges to "friend" parties that may appear before them because
Kentucky judges are elected and should not be isolated from the community in which they serve. The Kentucky
commission warned that a judge or justice should be "extremely cautious that such participation does not
otherwise result in violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.")
51. Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., supra note 17.
52. Id. (citing CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE STATE OF FLA. Canon 2A cmt. (2008), available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/ethics/09-15-2008_CodeJudicialConduct.pdf).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The New York Ethics Commission also noted that the public nature of the relationship between judges
and their ESN contacts or "friends" and the increased access that the friend would have, including access to any
personal information the judge chose to post on his/her own ESN profile, establishes, "at the [very] least, the
appearance of a stronger bond" between the judge and the friend. N.Y. State Advisory Comm. on Judicial
Ethics, supra note 39. It should be noted that in addition to judges, the concern that ESNs are viewable by the
public should be a matter of concern for attorneys as well. Kelly Phillips Erb advises, "Think about what you
post, from photos and videos to links, and how your colleagues and clients might react. Be mindful of the
impression that clients (and, more important, potential clients) may take away from the site." Erb, supra notel 7,
at 35. Nathan M. Crystal observes that "[t]hese technologies are a form of communication, but they radically
increase the number of people with whom such communications are made, and they transform what are often
ephemeral, private experiences into documented public expressions." Crystal, supra note 14, at 8.
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partiality toward those attorneys granted "friendship" status 56 and potentially
inspires the public to examine ajudge's ESN "friends" list and only hire attorneys
identified on the judge's "friends" list.57 Such activity not only provides, at least
implicitly, an improper benefit to the judge's Facebook "friends," it induces the
public into engaging in a harmful selection process regarding its legal representation and denotes the judge's potential for favoritism and partiality, which
threatens the public confidence in the judiciary.
C. OBJECTIONS TO THE RESTRICTIONIST APPROACH
1.

NEw HUMAN AssOcIATION

Despite the harmful potentialities associated with ESN "friending," some
integrationists claim the restrictionist approach represents a "hypersensitive"
on grounds that there already exist
response to judicial ESN "friending'
effective methods for dealing with a judge's "friends," such as motions to
disqualify whenever a judge is, or appears, biased.5 9 This contention, however,
seems blind to the reality that ESN technology shapes and controls the scale,
pace, and form of human association and action.6 0 ESN websites, such as
Facebook, are more than just communication exchange vehicles. They represent
a category of space through which people find, meet, and, arguably, form very
authentic relationships via the Internet. 6 1 As such, ESN websites are not merely
physical space substitutions but are unregulated virtual meeting and communication hubs that have expanded the scope of previous human interaction without the
accountability of physical presence.6 2 Hence, like the railroad and telephone,
ESN websites have created completely new kinds of human associations.6 3 Legal
tools that may have been sufficient during the pre-ESN era cannot and should not
prevent the advance of new legal methodologies and approaches to governing
judicial conduct.

56. Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., supra note 17; Anita Ramasastry, Why Florida'sBan on Judges'
"Friending" Lawyers on Facebook is the Right Call, FINDLAW.COM (Dec. 15, 2009), http://writ.1p.findlaw.com/
ramasastry/20091215.html. Becoming a "fan" of a judge, on the other hand, is permissible, as it requires no
interaction on the part of the judge. Id.
57. Ramasastry, supra note 56.
58. John Schwartz, For Judges on Facebook, Friendship Has Limits, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 2009, at A25
(quoting Professor Stephen Gillers, N.Y Univ.).
59. Id. (citing Professor Stephen Gillers, N.Y. Univ.).
60. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 8 (MIT Press 1994) (1964).
61. Grimmelmann, supra note 5, at 1154.
62. Duncan, supra note 16, at 543.
63. See McLuHAN, supra note 60, at 8.
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MILL's HARM PRINCIPLE

Integrationists also object to the restrictionist approach on grounds that it
offends the judge's autonomy, arguing that judges are in the best position to
determine whether they should engage in ESN "friendships."64 The premise of
this objection bears the imprint of allegiance to the literature of John Stuart Mill,
whose classic work, On Liberty, represents the most influential treatment of the
social consequences of interference with individual liberty. 65 Mill perceived
"autonomy as a special kind of value." 66 He reasoned that every person is entitled
to autonomy with respect to his personal affairs. 7 According to Mill, a person is
the one most interested in his or her own well-being.68 Any interest that another
can have in one's own affairs, "except in cases of strong personal attachment," is
negligible in comparison to one's interests in his or her own affairs. 69 Any
overruling of an individual's judgment with respect to his or her personal life can
only be "grounded on general presumptions; which may be altogether wrong, and
even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied" by someone unacquainted with
the individual's personal circumstances.7 0 Therefore, according to Mill, any error
that a person is likely to commit regarding his or her personal life is outweighed
by the harm of allowing others to overrule his or her discretion based on what
they believe is good.
At first glance, this particular integrationist objection appears consistent with
Mill's reasoning regarding the importance of autonomy. But even Mill, one of the
staunchest opponents of government interference with individual autonomy,
recognized the rectitude of restricting an individual's choices when the conduct at
issue harms others.7 2 Mill also acknowledged that where a person has received
the "protection of society," that person "owes a return for the benefit" and
protection he received and must bear his share of "sacrifices incurred for

64. See, e.g., John P. Hutchins, Legal Ethics in the Age of Internet Mobility, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
LAW INSTITUTE 2010: OPPoRruNmEs IN CLOUD COMPUTING, BLOGS, BRAND PROTECTION AND TARGETED

MARKETING, at 527, 540 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No.
23460, 2010) ("Stories such as [judges having left the bench because of transgressions on ESN websites] are
becoming more prevalent in the legal world, and it is up to attorneys [and judges] to balance their need and
desire to network on the internet with their duty to uphold ... the legal profession, and their reputations."); see
also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 2 ("A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in
which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed.").
65. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, reprintedin PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 219 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds.,
4th ed. 1991).
66. Daniel Markovitz, Contractand Collaboration,113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1512 n.228 (2004).
67. See Mill, supra note 65, at 220-21.
68. Id. at 221.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 221-22.
71. Id. at 222.
72. See id. at 224.
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defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. Mill argued
that if any part of a person's conduct prejudicially affects the interests of others,
society has jurisdiction over it, and the conduct becomes subject to restriction for
the benefit of the general welfare.74 If a person's conduct prevents him or her
from performing "some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is guilty
of a social offence."7 Hence, it logically follows that Mill would contend that,
although no person ought to be prevented from using ESN websites, a judge's
ESN usage should be restricted given that such behavior harms the public.
The premise of the autonomy objection also appears factually misplaced to the
extent that it relies on the assertion that judges are always better situated to
govern their own social relationships. An examination of 187 opinions from
forty-one state judicial ethics committees involving judges and their social
relationships76 indicated that fifty-nine, or 31.5%, of the questions presented to
the committees involved conduct that arguably violated the Judicial Code.77 Most
of these instances involved questionable uses of the judge's office for the benefit
of the judge's friends, e.g., writing letters of recommendation on judicial
letterhead, 8 attending political social functions, or having close relations with

73. Id. at 221.
74. Id. at 221, 224.
75. Id. at 224.
76. States whose judicial ethics committees do not issue opinions or who published no opinions regarding
judges' social relationships were excluded from the examination results, which are on file with the author and
available upon request.
77. Some statements by the committees were not definitive. E.g., Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op.
2002-17 (2002), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/2002-17n.html (stating that a judge is only
disqualified from those proceedings in which her fianc6 was personally involved); Wis. Judicial Conduct
Advisory Comm., Op. 97-7 (1997), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/judcond/DisplayDocument.
pdf~content=pdf&seqNo=899 (stating that a judge could not solicit campaign funds from close friends, but
that a campaigil committee acting for the judge could).
78. See, e.g., Ark. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2005-01 (2005), available at http://
www.accessarkansas.org/jeac/opinions/advisory_2005_01.pdf (stating that a judge cannot write a letter of
recommendation to a sentencing judge on behalf of a lifelong friend); Ark. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op.
95-01 (1995), available at http://www.accessarkansas.org/jeac/opinions/95_01.html (stating that a judge may
write a letter of recommendation for a friend, so long as it is not on judicial letterhead); S.C. Comm'n on
Judicial Conduct, Op. 6-1994 (1994), available at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/advisoryOpinions/
displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo=06-1994 (stating that a judge may not write a letter on behalf of a college
classmate who was convicted of a crime in 1978 and sought a pardon in 1994); State of Wash. Ethics Advisory
Comm., Op. 92-17 (1992), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs-orgs/pos...ethics/index.cfm?
fa=pos ethics.dispopin&mode=9217 (prohibiting a judge from writing a letter for the adult child of a family
friend in conjunction with federal sentencing proceedings); Digests of Informal Opinions, JUDICIAL ETes
COMM. OFTHE PA. CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES, http://ethics.pacourts.us/digests.htm (last visited Jan. 11,

2011) (reporting on a March 12, 2008 opinion prohibiting a judge from writing a letter to a district attorney on
behalf of the judge's friend who was arrested for driving under the influence).
79. See, e.g., Conn. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. No. 2009-07, in INFORMAL OPINION SUMMARIES 14
(2009), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/ethics/informal-surnmaryLog.pdf [hereinafter INFORMAL OPINION SUMMARIEs] (emergency staff opinion stating that a judge may not attend a public event where a
friend of the judge plans to announce his candidacy for public office); see also Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory
Comm., Op. 2004-30 (2004), available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/
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attorneys appearing before the judge.8 0 These findings raise serious questions as
to whether judges are in the best position to decide whether social relationships
compromise the prestige of their office or are harmful to the public.
3. ESN AND DWORKIN'S FUTURE-ORIENTED CONSENT
There is also considerable jurisprudential evidence indicating that the restrictionist approach does not interfere with a judge's autonomy, but, rather, is
consistent with it. Consider Gerald Dworkin's "future-oriented consent" theory,
which involves situations under which a person will come to welcome certain
coercive measures in the future rather than the time at which the coercion
occurs.81 Theorists have incorporated the principle into various types of legal
doctrines, e.g., restitution and incapacity. 82 For instance, in the case of cognitive
delusions, Dworkin reminds us that the law acts against the expressed will of the
person involved, but respects the person's true will.83 Dworkin explains that if a
man believes that he will fly when he jumps out of a window, the law permits
another to forcibly detain him against his expressed will. 84 The reasoning is that
the man does not truly wish to be injured or to injure someone else.8 If he were

jeacopinions/2004/2004-30.html (stating that a judicial candidate may not attend church and be introduced to
the congregation by an incumbent judge as a candidate and the judge's "guest and friend"); Ga. Judicial
Qualifications Comm., Op. 209 (1996), available at http://www.gajqc.com/opinions.cfm (accessed by
searching for Opinion Number 209) (stating that a judge may not put a bumper sticker on his personal vehicle
displaying his support for another judicial candidate who is a friend of the judge).
80. See, e.g., Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, Op. 81-99 (1981), availableat http://www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/
ao8l-99.htm (requiring that judges disqualify themselves from a capital murder case where the victim was the
son of the judges' personal friend); State of Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, Standing Comm. on Judicial
Ethics & Election Practices, Op. JEO4-002 (2004), available at http://judicial.state.nv.us/je040023new.htm
(requiring disqualification from civil eviction cases brought by the owner of an apartment complex who
discusses evictions with the judge and has a close personal relationship with the judge); N.Y. Advisory Comm.
on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-166 (2008), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/08166.htm (requiring a judge to disclose the fact that an attorney appearing before the judge was a personal friend
and former business associate of the judge); S.C. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2002 (2002), available
at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/advisoryOpinions/displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo= 17-2002 (stating that a
judge must disqualify himself from those cases where his girlfriend, a law enforcement agent, appears before
him); Conn. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. No. 2009-30, in INFORMAL OPINION SUMMARIES, supra note 79, at

29-30 (emergency staff opinion requiring a judge's disqualification when an attorney in the case has a close
relationship with the judge's family).
81. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism,in PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 258, 263-64 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds.,
Wadsworth Publ'g Co. 3d ed. 1986) (1975).
82. See, e.g., Credit Bureau Enters., Inc. v. Pelo, 608 N.W.2d 20, 25 (Iowa 2000) ("In certain circumstances,
however, restitution for services performed will be required even though the recipient did not request or
voluntarily consent to receive such services."); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986) ("For the State
to invoke [the parens patriae] interest [to justify overriding appellants' protests to the administration of
mind-altering drugs], 'the individual himself must be incapable of making a competent decision concerning
treatment on his own."') (quoting Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir. 1989)).
83. Dworkin, supra note 81, at 265.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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aware that he is mistaken as to the harmful consequences of his jump, he would
not wish to jump, and thus, would want another to stop him. 8 6 Hence, the man's
autonomy or will is satisfied by another's interference with his expressed desire,
although, at the time of interference, it appears unwelcome. For another to refrain
from interfering in such circumstances is to act against the person's autonomy or
true will.
A judge, being human, is not immune to deficiencies in knowledge, irrational
thinking, or social impulses or disorders. A judge, like any other person, may
engage in conduct that is harmful to himself, the public, or both. More
specifically, a judge, like any other person, may either attach incorrect weight to
some of his or her values, e.g., value for the taste of wine or tobacco over the
value of good health;88 inaccurately evaluate the risk associated with a specific
act when weighing it against the inconvenience of risk reducing measures, e.g.,
neglect to fasten a seatbelt or wear a helmet when riding a motorcycle because of
the inconvenience; 8 9 suffer from an inability to resist certain forms of immediate
pleasure90 or evaluate the consequences of certain interactions;91 or stand unable
to determine which course of action best reduces his or her risk.92
In the case of ESN, judges may incorrectly assess the effectiveness or
functionality of privacy settings, exercise poor judgment in the amount of time
they spend on ESN websites, or improperly weigh the negative consequences of
their ESN conduct. For example, Chief Judge Ernest H. Woods m recently
resigned from his seventeen-year position after it was revealed that he exchanged
improper emails with a defendant in his court, in violation of the Georgia Code of
Judicial Conduct. 9 3 Judge Matthew A. Sciarrino, Jr. was involuntarily transferred
because of his Facebook activity. 9 4 Judge Sciarrino maintained a Facebook page,
viewable by the public,9 5 through which he "friended" several lawyers, updated
his Facebook status from the bench, and "once took a photograph of his crowded
courtroom and posted it" on his Facebook page.96 Similarly, Judge Jonathan
86. Id.
87. See id. at 236.
88. See id. at 236-37.
89. Dworkin, supra note 81, at 258, 265.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Ga. Judge Steps Down Following Questions About Facebook Relationship With
Defendant, LAw.coM (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1202437652986.
94. John M. Annese, Staten Island Criminal Court Judge to be Transferredto ManhattanAfter Facebook
Postings, Sources Say, SnLivECoM (Oct. 15, 2009, 7:02 AM), http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/
criminal-court judgeto be tra.html.
95. Id. Some ESN.sites maintain that they have filters that will protect member profiles from public view.
See, e.g., Help Center, supra note 18 (follow "Privacy" hyperlink; then follow "Privacy settings and
fundamentals" hyperlink).
96. Daniel Leddy, MySpace, the Judge and Judicial Propriety, SILIVE.COM (Oct. 20, 2009, 7:19 AM),
http://www.silive.com/opinion/danielleddy/index.ssf/2009/10/myspace-the-judge.and-judicial.html.
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MacArthur was removed from office after he posted inflammatory language on
his MySpace page."
In light of the awareness of irrationality, temporal deficiencies in cognitive and
emotional capacities, and the avoidable and unavoidable ignorance that is
inimical to the execution of proper judicial duties, prudence suggests that judges
would desire the formation of a specific arrangement that restricts them from
making judicial decisions or behaving in certain ways that might produce
irreparable harm to the public. While judges may be willing to accept the risk of
harm to their person, they, presumably like most individuals, are less willing to
accept placing others at risk. Therefore, it is rational for judges to desire that
others prevent them from acting in a manner that harms the public or
compromises the prestige of the judicial office, though at the time of the judge's
conduct, the judge may not appreciate the value of the interference because of a
lapse in judgment, knowledge, or will power.98
For instance, few would deny that if a judge knows that he or she is susceptible
to defective judgment or behavior whenever certain temptation is present, it
would be reasonable for the judge to ask a friend to restrict his or her freedom
when such conditions are obvious to the friend but remain less obvious to the
judge, i.e., driving while intoxicated. 99 The judge consents to the friend's
infringement upon the judge's freedom even though at the time of consent, the
specific conditions or type of interference the friend may exercise may be
unknown to both at the time the consent is given, i.e., subsequently taking the
judge's car keys.
The rationality that supports the reasoning in the case of the judge's friend is
analogous, in many respects, to the reasoning employed by restrictionists. As
with the friend, with respect to the Judicial Code and the ethics commission that
interprets its applications, the judge does not consent to specific interference or
restriction. Rather, the judge consents to a code of conduct that includes
supervision by his or her peers, with an understanding that they may interfere
with the judge's freedom in order to safeguard the public and protect the judge's
interest. The various ethics commissions and Judicial Code, in restricting the
judge's conduct, are, in effect, aligning the judge's conduct with the conduct the
judge would choose if free from cognitive or behavioral imperfection.100 In short,
the ethics restrictions are consistent with judges' autonomy or will and accurately
reflect judges' desire to avoid harming the highly vulnerable public.o10
Put succinctly, the restrictionist approach respects ajudge's autonomy, upholds

97. Martha Neil, Temp Judge Fired Over MySpace Post, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.abajournal.
comlnews/article/temp-judge fired over-myspace-post/.
98. See Dworkin, supra note 81, at 264.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 237.
101. See id. at 232, 237.
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the prestige and reputation of the judicial office, and protects the public from
harm in a manner in which the integrationist approach falls short. 10 2 It is not that
integrationists do not value the public welfare. Rather, integrationists appear to
recognize the risk of ESN "friending," but either discount the degree to which
restricting a judge's use of ESN websites is consistent with the judge's desire to
avoid harmful consequences relative to ESN usage10 3 or underestimate the
likelihood of ESN "friending" leading to violations of the Judicial Code. But as
the discussion below reveals, ESN "friending" has the potential to create
numerous ethical problems for judges when one considers the specific text of all
four canons of the Judicial Code.
III. ESN AND THE JUDICIAL CODE CANONS

A. CANON ONE: JUDGES AND ESN FRIENDSHIPS
Canon One of the Judicial Code ("Canon One") requires a judge or judicial
candidate to "uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary, and .. . [to] avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."104 By its terms, it could be accurately described as the "public perception"
canon 0 5 because it was designed to promote public confidence and protect the
prestige of the judicial office.10 6 Ajudge violates Canon One by failing to comply
with the law, court rules, or provisions of the Judicial Code, o7 or by engaging in
conduct that creates in "reasonable minds" the perception that the judge acted in a
way that reflects poorly on her "honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to
serve as a judge."o It prohibits, among other things, judges from using or
attempting to use their office for personal gain.109 It renders improper a judge's
use of: (1) "judicial status to gain favorable treatment in encounters with traffic
officials" or (2) official "judicial letterhead for [personal] gain" or "to exert
pressure by reason of the judicial office."" 0

102. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256-57 (2009) (holding that, despite the lack
of actual bias, the Fourteenth Amendment compels a judge to recuse himself when one of the parties appearing
before him contributed large amounts of money to the judge's electoral campaign).
103. See Dworkin, supra note 81, at 259, 265.
104. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1.
105. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 & cmt. 1 ("Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by

improper conduct and conduct that creates the appearance of impropriety. This principle applies to both the
professional and personal conduct of a judge.").
106. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2.
107. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.1.
108. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 & cmt. 5.
109. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 & cmt. 1.
110. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmts. 1-2; e.g., Spruance v. Comm'n on Judicial
Qualifications, 532 P.2d 1209, 1216-19, 1220, 1225-26 (Cal. 1975) (removing the judge from office because,
among other things, he heard cases involving the son of a friend and political supporter, the nephew of a friend
and political supporter, and an attorney who was dating the judge's daughter); In re Former Judge Wasilenko, 49
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Canon One does not require the judge to be found impartial or biased.'
Rather, a judge violates Canon One when the judge engages in conduct that gives
the impression that the judge is partial to one party or the other or subject to the
influence of another person.11 2 A violation of Canon One certainly occurs if a
judge permits others to use the judge's office to advance their personal or
financial interest. 11 3 Hence, whenever a judge permits an ESN user to be a
"friend," the judge risks violating this ethical standard because a potential
consequence of ESN "friending" is that the ESN user could use the ESN
"friendship" with the judge to advance his or her personal or financial interest.114
B. CANON TWO: JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS AND ESN FRIENDSHIPS
The standards enunciated under Canon One are closely aligned with those
stated in Canon Two, which requires judges to perform their judicial duties not
only impartially, but competently and diligently.1 5 Judicial Canon Two has

Cal. 4th CJP Supp. 26, 32, 34, 36-37, 39,49, 52 (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial Performance 2005) (concluding that
the judge should have recused himself from hearing numerous traffic violations of friends and family members).
111. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcr Canon 1, R. 1.2 cmt. 3 ("Conduct that compromises or appears to
compromise the independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the
judiciary.") (emphasis added).
112. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr R. 1.2; see In re Corboy, 528 N.E.2d 694, 700-01 (Ill. 1988) (per
curiam) (noting that where an attorney gave a judge $1,000, this gives the impression of influence over the
judge); People v. Bradshaw, 525 N.E.2d 1098, 1101-02 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that a judge erred in not
recusing himself after a meeting in which a sheriff deputy, who worked in the judges' courtroom, informed the
judge that she was the mother of one of the victims in a case before the judge; and opining that the judge was
required to avoid giving the public the impression that he was improperly influenced); see alsoIn re Cresap, 940
So.2d 624, 635, 638-39 (La. 2006) (holding that the judge violated a Louisiana ethics rule that forbid judges
from "convey[ing] the impression that others are in a position to influence the judge"); In re Eskridge, 559
S.E.2d 575, 575-76 (S.C. 2002) (per curiam) (noting the appearance that a public official had influence over a
judge, when the public official would give the judge a list of the defendants set to appear before the judge, with
"NG" for "Not guilty" appearing beside some of the defendants' names, and the judge would subsequently find
these defendants not guilty).
113. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr R. 1.3.
114. See, e.g., Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., supranote 17 (stating that, by simply listing an attorney
who may appear before a judge as a "friend," the judge advances the personal interest of that attorney by
conveying "a special position to influence the judge"); N.Y. State Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, supra
note 39 (stating that befriending lawyers could lead to "increased access . .. to any personal information the
judge chooses to post on his/her own profile page," which could create "at least, the appearance of a stronger
bond").
115. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 2. Among the factors to be considered in determining

whether a judge's impartiality has been compromised are: the duration of the relationship, frequency of
communications between the party and the judge, the time and date of communications, and the nature of the
relationship. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11; McCullough v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance,

776 P.2d 259, 262-64 (Cal. 1989) (holding that where there was a long-term friendship and the judge had
extra-judicial discussions with the friend about the case, the judge should have disqualified himself); Spruance,
532 P.2d at 1216-19, 1220, 1225-26 (holding that the judge should not have heard cases involving the son of a
friend and political supporter, the nephew of a friend and political supporter, and an attorney who was dating the
judge's daughter); In re Wasilenko, 49 Cal. 4th CJP Supp. at 32, 34, 36-37, 39, 49, 52 (holding that where the
judge heard numerous traffic violations of friends and family members, he should have recused himself); see
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multiple broad components that present serious questions regarding the permissibility of ESN "friending." For instance, judges are required to be "dignified"
when interacting with "litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court
officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity,"
(collectively referred to as "court participants.")' 1 6 Undue influence or even the
appearance of undue influence on the part of the judge compromises the dignity
of the judge's office."' 7 Nonetheless, a judge may, albeit unintentionally, unduly
influence a court participant simply by requesting an ESN friendship. Circum-

stances may arise in which a court participant may have personal reasons for
desiring not to "befriend" a judge on an ESN website. 1 Because of the power
and influence intrinsic to the judicial office, however, the court participant may
not feel free to deny the judge's ESN "friend" request and, subsequently, may
accept it despite his or her true desire to do otherwise.H 9 The resulting ESN
"friendship" with the court participant heightens the risk of recusal or disqualification of the judge from hearing cases involving or relating to the court
participant. This outcome not only offends the "dignity" requirement under
Canon Two but also stands in stark contrast to judges' duty to avoid "personal and
extrajudicial activities" that increase the risk of disqualification. 12 0
Canon Two also requires judges, and their agents, to refrain from initiating,
permitting, or considering ex parte communications with one of the attorneys or a
party to the case before them. 1 21 This prohibition includes ESN communications.

also Schupper v. Colorado, 157 P.3d 516, 521 (Colo. 2007) (holding that recusal was not necessary where the
judge was a former district attorney, who was friends with a member of the prosecution team, because the
relationship was from the past and not recent); In re Disqualification of Bressler, 688 N.E.2d 517, 518 (Ohio
1997) (holding recusal not necessary where the judge was friends with a detective who was a witness in the
case); People v. Booker, 585 N.E.2d 1274, 1284-85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that the judge did not have to
recuse himself from the present case where he had represented the victim's father in a previous matter).
116. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.8(B).
117. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.4(C) & cmt. 1.
118. See Arthur Bright, The Judge Would Like to Be Your "Friend",CrZEN MEDIA L. PROJECT BLOG (Sept.
4, 2009), http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2009/judge-would-be-your-friend ("[Ilt's not hard to imagine
situations where lawyers might mouth off on Facebook about something wholly unrelated to their cases, but
nevertheless get into hot water when the judge takes a dim view of their thoughts or opinions.").
119. See id. ("[W]hen it comes to judges friending lawyers, the judges have an awful lot of power. Would a
lawyer really be comfortable rejecting a judge's request, given that the lawyer always wants to stay on the
judge's good side, both for his own good and that of his client?").
120. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.1 & cmt. 1. Judges must also avoid making hostile remarks or
exhibiting apparent bias towards someone on an ESN site that will appear before them. See Neil, supra note 97
(reporting that a temporary judge in Las Vegas was removed from the judicial office after he posted comments
on his personal MySpace page that were "reportedly hostile to prosecutors and used graphic language").
121. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9; see also Tyson v. State, 622 N.E.2d 457, 460 (Ind. 1993)
(holding that a judge's recusal was warranted where the judge's wife had ex parte communications with an
attorney appearing before the judge). For example, in Vaska v. Alaska, defendant challenged a judge's
impartiality on the ground that there were improper ex parte communications between the judge's law clerk and
a state's attorney and that the judge's law clerk and the state's attorneys were friends. Vaska v. Alaska, 955 P.2d
943, 944-45 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). The law clerk sent a communication to the state's attorney that clearly
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Perhaps the most widely known offender of the rule is Judge B. Carlton Terry, Jr.,
who was reprimanded for his Facebook activity. 122 Judge Terry befriended one of
the attorneys appearing before him in a child custody case. 1 23 Throughout the
case, Judge Terry updated his Facebook page with news of the trial, posted
statements regarding material witnesses, and responded to the attorney's
Facebook post, "I hope I'm in my last day of trial," with "[Y]ou are in your last
day of trial." 12 4 Judge Terry's ESN activity amounted to prohibited "ex parte
communications with counsel for a party in a matter being tried before him."125
Judge Terry's actions also contravened Canon Two's prohibition against making
12 6
judicial statements on pending and impending cases.
C. CANON THREE: JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND ESN "FRIENDSHIPS"
While Canon Two requires a judge to perform his or her duties "impartially,
competently, and diligently," 12 7 Canon Three governs how judges conduct
themselves outside their judicial activities. 1 2 8 Together, Canons Two and Three
require that a judge's official duties take precedence over any and all other
activities in which the judge may become involved. 129 To that end, judges may
never divest themselves of their judicial responsibilities. Once installed into
office, the status of judge is indelibly imprinted on that person and the
responsibilities associated with the judicial office apply both during the judge's
professional activities and personal affairs, including personal ESN activities.130
Therefore, judges are required to conduct their "personal and extrajudicial
activities [so as] to minimize the risk of conflict with the obligations of judicial
office." 3t 1 Canon Three prohibits ESN "friendship" because the activities
constrained by Canon Three include, but are not limited to: (1) using nonpublic
information for personal gain;132 (2) affiliating with an organization that practices
favored the state's attorney, and signed it "P.S. FOR YOUR EYES ONLY!!!" Id. at 944. The court ruled that the
law clerk's behavior was suspected to give rise to a reasonable appearance of judicial bias. Id. at 946.
122. State of N.C. Judicial Standards Comm'n, Inquiry No. 08-234 (2009), available at http://
www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coaljsc/publicreprimands/jsc08-234.pdf.
123. Id. at 2.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 3.
126. See id. at 2-3 (reporting that the judge had ex parte communications with one of the attorneys in a case
he was presiding over, writing on the attorney's wall that he had "two good parents to choose from" and that the
attorney was in his "last day of trial"); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(A) (prohibiting judges
from communicating about pending and impending cases with limited exceptions).
127. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2.
128. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.
129. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1(C) (prohibiting a judge from "participat[ing] in activities that
would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality").
130. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 & cmt. 1.
131. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.
132. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.5 cmt. 1; see also Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op.
2005-12(2005), available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPracticelopinions/jeacopinions/2005/
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invidious discrimination; 13 3 (3) soliciting contributions for a not-for-profit
organization; 134 and (4) practicing law 35 via the ESN website. Hence, simply by
befriending certain organizations via their officers or central figures, or exchanging certain types of information with an ESN "friend," a judge may violate Canon
Three.
D. CANON FOUR: JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNING AND ESN "FRIENDS"
Some judges join ESN sites, such as Facebook, not only for social networking,
but also for judicial campaigning purposes.1 3 6 Similar to Canon Three, Canon
Four prohibits a judge or judicial candidate from engaging "in political or
campaign activity that is inconsistent with the independence, integrity, or
impartiality of the judiciary." 3 7 It bars judges and judicial candidates from
engaging in certain activities or certain types of postings on ESN sites, as well as
sending certain types of communications to their ESN "friends." 3 8 Prohibited
ESN communications include, but would not be limited to: (1) soliciting
campaign contributions; 13 9 (2) publicly endorsing or opposing a candidate for
2005-12.html (holding that a judge could "not produce or narrate a video in which the judge requests 'help,'
'support' for a project to restore a courtroom even if the video was seeking more than just financial support,
namely moral or vocal support, because of the requested financial contribution); Ga. Judicial Qualification
Comm'n, Op. 133 (1989), available at http://gajqc.com/opinions.cfm (accessed by searching for Opinion
Number 133) (ruling that a judge, who was a Chairman on the Tara District of Atlanta Area Council for the Boy
Scouts of America, could not participate in fundraising activities; and when a letter was sent out by the Council
for fundraising purposes with the judge's name included in the text, the conduct was considered an ethical
violation despite the judge having been unaware that his name would be contained therein).
133. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.6.
134. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.7(A)(2).
135. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.10; Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 94-2 (1994), available at
http://www.ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/94-2.htm (holding that a judge should not practice law, and noting that the
rule which prohibits the practice of law is not limited to those legal activities that result in compensation, but
also extends to the provision of legal services on a pro bono basis and providing legal advice to members of a
fraternal organization); see also N.Y. State Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, supra note 39 ("[U]sers of the
social network, upon learning of the judge's identity, may informally ask the judge questions about or seek to
discuss their cases, or seek legal advice. As is true in face-to-face meetings, a judge may not engage in these
communications.").
136. E.g., Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., supra note 17 (permitting a judge's campaign committee to
post information on the committee's site); Allison Petty, Social Networking Web Sites Raise Ethical Issuesfor
Judges, Lawyers, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 3, 2010, § 1, at 1 (reporting that Illinois judges frequently use
Facebook as an inexpensive means of campaigning); Rozen, supra note 6 (reporting that Judge Susan Criss uses
Facebook for both "personal and professional networking purposes," including "'friending' lawyers on
Facebook to network and possibly to campaign').
137. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4.
138. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1; see also N.Y. State Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics,

supra note 39 ("The Committee has, for example, advised that a court should not provide a link on its web page
to an advocacy group for Megan's Law which listed the names and counties of residence for registered sex
offenders. A judge should thus recognize the public nature of anything he/she places on a social network page
and tailor any postings accordingly.").
139. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, R. 4.1(A)(8); see also Simes v. Ark. Judicial

Discipline & Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d 876, 877, 884 (Ark. 2007) (holding that the Judicial
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public office; 14 0 (3) making statements that commit, or appear to commit, a judge
to rule a given way on legal issues within cases that will likely come before the
court; 14 1 (4) "knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth," misrepresenting information about themselves, an opponent, or an issue in a campaign;14 2 (5)
making representations about a candidate or judge's sexual activities;1 4 3 (6)
speaking on behalf of a political organization;1" and (7) seeking, accepting, or
using endorsements from political organizations.' 4 5 For the above reasons, the
restrictionist approach is consistent with the four canons because it incorporates
the protections enunciated under the relevant rules supporting each canon.
CONCLUSION
This essay has explained the various legal risks associated with ESN
"friending" under the Judicial Code. The rapid expansion of ESN websites and
Commission's determination that the judge violated the ethical rules by asking attorneys for campaign
contributions before they were due to appear in court was not clearly erroneous).
140. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr R. 4.1(A)(3); see also Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 94-11 (1994),
available at http://ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/94-1l.htm (advising that Illinois judges are prohibited from
"publicly stating their opinions regarding candidates for office," and noting that the ethical rules "clearly
prohibit[] ajudge who is not a candidate from publicly endorsing or opposing any candidate for judicial or other
public office"); In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 603 So.2d 494, 495-98 (Fla. 1992) (ruling that the challenged
canons of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct were constitutional and finding that the rules did not deprive a
judge of his right to free speech when he wrote an open letter, which was published by several newspapers, to
electors encouraging them to vote for the retention of another judge). In discussing the special place judges hold
in society, the Supreme Court of Florida stated:
The great mass of the people think that judges are different, that their special relationship to the law is
what makes them different, that they are not merely political authorities, weighing and balancing
interests, but legal authorities, guided and restrained by the law. It is this conviction, more than
anything else, which compels the people to obey orders of the court. It is this conviction, more than
anything else, which gives judges a power and authority that so resembles political power that they
mistakenly think they are political people.
In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 603 So.2d at 497-98 (quoting Robert A. Goldwin, Comments to Chapter 1, in
THE JUDICIARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 19 (Leonard J. Theberge ed., D.C. Heath & Co. 1979)).
141. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr R. 4.1(A)(12).
142. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(1l); see also In re Tully, 2 111. Cts. Comm. 150, 154,
157 (1991) (holding that a judicial candidate's authorization and approval of "improper advertisements" that
implied he was already a judge by including terminology like "VOTE FOR JOHN P. TULLY APPELLATE
COURT JUDGE" constituted an intentional misrepresentation because candidate was a circuit court judge
running for a seat on the appellate court, and not an appellate judge running for reelection).
143. At least one ethics commission has reasoned that it is impermissible for a judicial candidate to disclose
information about an opponent's private sexual conduct, even if that information is factually accurate, unless the
conduct would result in a criminal or judicial disciplinary violation. See Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 03-01
(2003), available at http://ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/03-01.htm. Canon Four, however, does not appear to
prohibit judicial candidates from truthfully contrasting their background and experience with that of an
opponent. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(11) & cmt. 7. Nor does it appear improper to
discuss issues such as an opponent's health, work habits, philosophy, or sources of campaign funding, so long as
the judicial candidate tells the truth. See id.
144. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(2).
145. See id.
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their growing technological capacities are likely to present additional risks of

judicially infirm conduct and public harm as ESN usage nurtures and creates new
patterns of human association. To avoid the perils that emanate from current and
future ESN capacities-including, but not limited to, "friending"-the Judicial
Code should be viewed as a restrictive juridical construct. The restrictive
approach not only safeguards the public better than the integrative approach, it
also decreases the risks of judicial disqualification and recusal. Whether one is
jurisprudentially inclined to agree with Mill's well-established harm principle,or
persuaded by Dworkin's influential future-oriented consent theory, it remains
clear that each principle aligns itself with the restrictive approach and recognizes
the primacy of harm-avoiding approaches to self-regarding and other-regarding
conduct, which is consistent with the purpose of the Judicial Code.
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